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The civil service of independent Ireland had a powerful and united organisation at the establishing of the state in 1922 but the subsequent history was one of fragmentation into increasingly isolated and narrow associations shaped by grade and departmental exclusivity.  The civil service developed and tried different strategies in a struggle to exercise some control over their conditions but had little success in building a common front.  It was not until the 1980s, under the aegis of Congress, that civil service trade unionism was able to rebuild the unity which it had initially presented to the Provisional Government in 1922.
 
The Provisional Government
With the formation of the Provisional Government the revolutionary movement had to make a rapid transition from State-destroying to State-building.  The British government expected that the takeover of the Dublin Castle administration would be a gradual process, with the Provisional Government proceeding one department at a time.  The Provisional Government in fact moved with great speed and decisiveness in assuming full control of the State.  On January 16, having taken the ‘surrender’ of Dublin Castle, the Provisional Government directed that all public servants hitherto under the authority of the British government were now under its control and ordered that there be no alteration in the status, rights and pay of civil servants without its permission.​[1]​  Most of the senior civil servants lined up in Dublin Castle on Monday 16 January 1922 viewed the new Provisional Government with a mixture of fear and cynicism.  Some baulked at being compelled to ‘grasp hands red with the blood of government servants’.​[2]​   The ‘surrender’ of Dublin Castle to the revolutionaries threatened those civil servants closely identified with the British State, but for many of the ordinary civil servants it offered new opportunities.  Ireland had very few Class 1 civil servants, due to the quasi-colonial form of Dublin Castle administration, and was dominated by the lower clerical grades.  For many of these a national government offered possibilities of promotion.  As soon as the Treaty was approved Conn Murphy and Michael Gallagher wrote to the secretary of Dáil Éireann, Diarmaid O'Hegarty, introducing themselves as the staff side of the ‘Irish Civil Service Joint Whitley Committee’ but now representing the new “Executive Committee of the Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants”, with whom ‘any future Irish government may conduct such negotiations as may be deemed necessary’. They also forwarded a detailed memorandum on the current situation of the Irish civil service and its relationship with the Castle government, the Belfast regime and the Provisional Government.​[3]​   The memorandum explained that the Conference represented the entire fifty-six organisations of the civil service.  With the formation of the Provisional Government the official side of the Irish Whitley Council had lapsed.  The staff side now looked to the Provisional Government to form ‘consultation and conciliation machinery of a kind more suitable to Irish conditions’.  What the civil service offered was full co-operation with any changes initiated by the Provisional Government, what they  wanted in return was an assurance that changes in conditions would be negotiated through the Executive Committee of the Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants.​[4]​  A delegation of the Irish branch of the Customs and Excise Federation (CEF) (who had always expected to be retained as an imperial service in any Home Rule administration) also met with the government to seek reassurances whilst also indicating a general enthusiasm for serving the new government..​[5]​  Even the professional civil servants could summon up some degree of enthusiasm.  At the annual general meeting in March 1922 the President of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS) welcomed the ‘new vistas of usefulness that was gradually opening before the Institution’.​[6]​  
In the cabinet the correspondence from the civil service associations was noted but ignored.  Conn Murphy had some unofficial meetings with Collins, Griffith, and MacNéill, but nothing concrete emerged from these meetings.​[7]​  Although the official break with Whitleyism was not announced until December 1924, and departmental councils continued to meet, the decision to do away with it was in fact made early in the term of the Provisional Government.​[8]​  Discussing a memorandum on the Whitley Councils prepared by James MacMahon, which included Conn Murphy’s observations, the Provisional Government decided that they posed an unacceptable limitation to the power of the Executive, were un-Irish, and ordered that they should immediately cease working.​[9]​  As the Treaty split began to edge toward crisis Collins agreed to meet a deputation from the civil service associations.  The points that the deputation wanted to discuss were the status, salaries and conditions of service of the civil service that would be retained, the establishment of a Civil Service Committee to oversee any dismissals or retirements from the civil service that might arise from the Treaty, as was provided in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, and the setting up of a new Irish Civil Service National Council.​[10]​  On the first point the deputation was assured that the government, while not being in a position to give a guarantee (as they could not bind their successors) had no desire to interfere with the existing rights and privileges of civil servants.  The specific assurance offered was that the government ‘would try to ensure that future conditions will be no worse than hitherto and had no intention to deprive civil servants of any rights held under the former government’.  The question of a Civil Service Committee to deal with retiring or dismissed civil servants was being addressed by the newly constituted Wylie committee.  On the question of retirements and pensions Collins quoted Article 10 of the Treaty which promised that ‘the Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms no less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of the police Forces and other Public Servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of government.’  On the request for an Irish Civil Service National Council Collins was wary and it was clear to the deputation that the Provisional Government was opposed to the idea.  Instead it offered a special commission to find out ‘whether the object of an Irish National Council could not be effected in a different manner’.  Until the question was decided a temporary consultative committee was offered.​[11]​

The postal workers’ strike.
As the Provisional Government came into office the British government had already made a decision that the civil service would face a significant reduction in pay following the Geddes committee report into the cost of the civil service.  In February 1922 the British government imposed the “Geddes Supercut” of between ten and fifty per cent on civil service salaries along with an overall maximum total remuneration of £2,000.​[12]​  When the Provisional Government decided to impose the “Geddes” cut in Ireland only the postal workers signalled resistance.  The postal workers, organised in three unions; the Irish Postal Union (IPU), the Irish Postal Workers’ Union (IPWU) and the Irish Post Office Engineers’ Union (IPOEU); threatened to go on a co-ordinated strike if the cuts were imposed.  A request by J.J. Walsh, the Irish Postmaster General, to the British Postmaster General to provide strike-breakers got a positive response.  The British government was anxious about the impact on their own civil service of any successful agitation against cuts in Ireland at a time when the two civil services were still closely linked.​[13]​  The British civil service unions were in fact following the course of this first confrontation between the new government and its civil service with great interest.​[14]​  But the Dáil and Collins repudiated this ‘scab’ tactic.​[15]​  Collins was in fact very worried by the complications that labour troubles would add to the developing Treaty split and wanted a settlement.  He asked James Douglas to chair a commission to consider wages, salaries, organisation of work and conditions generally in the post office.​[16]​  The Department of Finance was hesitant about an outsider, Douglas, examining civil service pay and conditions, as in their view it set an unhealthy precedent.​[17]​  Douglas settled the threatened strike by securing a temporary rise in the basic salary, rather than a reduction in bonus, and promising to effect a reorganisation of the post office.​[18]​
	In September a new cost of living calculation, based on the new Irish figure that was lower than that in Britain, was due.  This meant that the civil service still faced a cut in salaries, though now it would not be as severe as that in Great Britain.​[19]​  In the Provisional Government the expectation was that the postal workers would use the Labour party in the Dáil to make complaints rather than take direct action.  The government offered to phase in the reductions, so long as the principle of reductions was accepted.  Negotiations broke down and a strike was declared.​[20]​  By now, in the weeks after the killing of Michael Collins, the civil war was entering its darkest phase.  Faced with a strike by the postal workers the government responded as if the strike was inspired by ‘Irregulars’ rather than by discontent on pay.​[21]​  The Provisional Government recruited pensioners and unemployed to act as strike breakers and issued a statement that ‘the government does not recognise the right of Civil Servants to strike.  In the event of a cessation of work by any section of the Postal Service picketing such as is permitted in connection with industrial disputes will not be allowed’.​[22]​  Few civil servants would have conceived of ever going on strike, but to be told that the right to strike was expressly denied them by their employer was a shock, especially since that same government had left the Whitley Councils in suspension, the only institutional forum for addressing grievances in the civil service. 
In the Dáil it was implied that the strikers, led by a ‘clique of Dublin postmen’, were motivated by hostility to the government and sympathy for the irregulars and that they were out to subvert the government.​[23]​  The army broke up the attempted pickets of the Dublin telephone exchange, pickets in Dundalk were arrested by military patrols and eventually the postal workers were forced to admit defeat, their return negotiated by Thomas Johnson of the ILPTUC.  The other civil service organisations, which had accepted the cuts, remained aloof from the strike but the assertion that they had no right to strike made a deep impression and was often referred to as an example of the autocratic attitude of the government.

Saorstát Éireann and the civil service
The postal workers’ September strike coincided with the first meeting of the Third Dáil, elected in June 1922 to debate and pass the constitution of the Irish Free State.​[24]​  The debate on the status of the transferred civil servants was brief and uncontroversial.​[25]​  All of the 21,035 officials transferred had, under the Treaty, a right to compensation if they resigned as a consequence of the transfer of government or were dismissed.  In fact however the majority of this apparently vast bureaucracy was the now thoroughly humiliated postal staff.  The civil service proper of administrative, executive, clerical and professional grades was about 6,000.​[26]​  Articles 77 of the constitution provided that ‘every such existing officer who was transferred from the British Government by virtue of any transfer of services to the Provisional Government shall be entitled to the benefit of Article 10 of the Scheduled Treaty’.  which stated that 'the government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of police forces and other public servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of government'.  The inclusion of this assurance in the Treaty, in effect a constitutional guarantee of their status, seemed to assure a fair deal in future negotiations and was initially of great relief to the civil service.​[27]​   The 1920 act set out in considerable detail the compensation and pension entitlements of civil servants dismissed, permitted to retire, or who chose to retire.  However Article 10 of the Treaty differed in significant ways to the guarantees contained in the 1920 act.  Though Article 10 offered guarantees to those civil servants who were dismissed or chose to retire, it offered no guarantees in terms of status or conditions to those who chose to remain in the service of the Irish Free State.​[28]​    

Re-organising civil service trade unionism in  the independent State
Coinciding with the establishment of the Irish Free State the civil service experienced a renewed growth in organisation.  In March 1922 delegates of the Irish branches of the Customs and Excise Federation, which included Derry and Belfast, met to form an Irish association; the Customs and Excise Association (CEA).​[29]​  The government suppression of the September strike in the Post Office helped to create the powerful Post Office Workers’ Union (POWU), through the amalgamation of the smaller postal workers unions in June 1923.​[30]​  
In February 1923 a conference of Irish civil service organisations recognised the Irish Civil Service Federation (CSF), which had been formed early in 1922, to act as a single voice in negotiation with the government.  The Federation was an alliance of various staff federations that grew out of the ad hoc “Executive Committee of the Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants” that had met with Collins.  Thus the Federation in its structures sought to act as an umbrella organisation for the many autonomous and diverse civil service organisations.​[31]​  The IPCS joined the initial steering committee of the Federation but though IPCS delegates contributed to the discussions it was finally decided by the narrowest majority to remain outside.  The Federation was therefore dominated by the ordinary clerical and executive civil servants.​[32]​   The POWU, smarting after the defeat inflicted by the government on pay reduction, also remained outside the Federation.  The CEA was initially enthusiastic on joining, but the heavy financial commitment that entailed and the refusal of the Federation to offer a lower affiliation fee led to the decision to withdraw.​[33]​  At its height the Federation organised sixteen associations representing just over 1,500 civil servants.​[34]​  This poor level of saturation in a potential membership of approximately 6,000 requires explanation.  The civil service associations’ poor level of support reflects in part the loss of leadership due to retirements and promotions, the disruption of the government departments, which were the organisational base for organisation, the concentration on the rights of retiring officials, but especially the failure to achieve a replacement for the Whitley Councils.  The first issue of IRIS, the Journal of the Civil Service Federation, noted that at the time of the Treaty the civil service welcomed national independence.  However, one year later the mood was one of foreboding.  National freedom meant an attack on workers, on trade unions and on the civil service.​[35]​     
The pre-war leadership of the Irish civil service associations continued into the time of the Provisional  Government but was then reduced by retirements and by promotions.​[36]​  However the associations had sufficiently deep roots to generate a new cadre of leadership with relatively little difficulty.  The experiences of the world war and independence struggle also encouraged a more aggressive and less deferential style of leadership.  This was in fact a general European phenomenon as white-collar trade unions and professional associations of the middle classes gave the lead in post-war industrial unrest.   
The British civil service organisations were very helpful to the Irish civil service and played a vital role in setting them on secure foundations.​[37]​  Coming as it did in the same year that saw a hostile press campaign, the imposition of the Geddes cuts on the membership, cuts in civil service pensions, deferment of re-organisation and the abolition of the Civil Service Arbitration Board, the practical and financial help given was a remarkable gesture of solidarity by the British civil servants.​[38]​

Regulating the civil service
Inheriting pre-independence nationalist suspicion of the Dublin Castle civil service as an alien intrusion, government policy aimed to reshape the civil service into a smaller, cheaper and centralised administrative bureaucracy brought firmly under the control of native government.  The Irish government’s Civil Service (Regulation) Act of 1924 brought all the departmental staffs into a single civil service under the control of the Minister of Finance.​[39]​  The Act also established the Civil Service Commission to recruit future civil servants by open competitive examinations and empowered the Minister of Finance to make, change or revoke regulations for establishing the classification, remuneration, conditions and terms of service of the civil servants.  Thus while the Civil Service Commission controlled recruitment the minister would remain solely responsible for management of the civil service.​[40]​  The Ministers and Secretaries Act centralised the departments of government in an executive of twelve ministers.  The key department was that of finance, which took charge of the administration and business of public finances and to which was assigned the civil service commission.  Although each department continued to appoint their own civil servants each appointment required the express permission of the Minister of Finance.​[41]​  
The 1925 Treasonable and Seditious Offences Act included a paragraph that ‘every person who incites any person in the civil service (other than a police force) of the Government of Saorstát Éireann to refuse, neglect, or omit to perform his duty or to commit any other act in dereliction of his duty, shall be guilty of felony.’  The constitution guaranteed the right to join unions and organise.  The POWU and the CSCU were affiliated to the ITUC and to the Labour party.  But the combination of the 1925 Treasonable Offences Act, the 1927 Trade Union Act and the Treasury circular 14/1927 ‘civil service (approved associations) regulations’ were designed to suppress any public display of civil service discontent, including withholding labour, which would almost certainly lead to dismissal.​[42]​  Denying the right to organise a strike was simply the logical extension of the denial of the right to strike.  It was only by overcoming its deference and inherent conservatism that the civil service could make  full use of its labour affiliation.​[43]​  

The civil service representative council
In May 1922 Collins had assured a delegation of the civil service that though he could not commit any future government to acceptance of the Whitley councils he did accept the need for some consultative body.  The Whitley Joint Committee was abolished but the departmental councils were allowed continue and an ad hoc consultative council of official and staff sides was established for the transition period.  The consultative council had six staff side and six official side representatives.  All matters that hitherto came before the Whitley Committee were to be dealt with by the consultative council.  It met first on 20 September 1922 and monthly thereafter.​[44]​  Whilst the staff representatives saw this arrangement as a temporary substitute for some future form of reinstated Whitleyism, Collins and the Provisional  Government saw this as a purely temporary arrangement to facilitate the transition to native rule.  Whilst the CSF was willing to work the consultative council the POWU and IPCS were suspicious as it was clear that as a purely ad hoc and temporary body it as no substitute for the Whitley Committee.​[45]​  The CSF continued to hope for a Whitley-like body on which ‘representatives of official and staff sides meet, not for mere ventilation of grievances but to give both sides co-equal interest and power…a body for action not talk, fostering and developing in the staff that spirit of co-operative responsibility which was the guiding principle in the Irish-Ireland movement’.​[46]​  A year later, with the transition period complete and the Civil Service Regulation Act in force, the civil service associations continued to demand the reinstatement of something like the departmental Whitley Councils.  However in February 1924 the Whitley Committee was formally abolished with the government offering, at a meeting with civil service representatives, nothing more than a promise to establish new machinery ‘more suited to Saorstát Éireann conditions’.​[47]​ 
In December 1924 Blythe issued without discussion or consultation a scheme for a representative council for the civil service made up of official and staff sides, composed of civil servants, with no political representative.  The chairman of the council was to be a nominee of the minister but without a vice-chair nominated by the staff side, as had been the case with the Whitley Committee.  The chairman had full control of the agenda and also wrote the report of the proceedings sent to the minister.  Blythe also forbad any non-service members at the council, thus thwarting the recent decision of the POWU and the CSCA to appoint full-time general secretaries and professionalise their representation.  In every respect therefore Blythe’s proposal was a calculated and deliberate rejection of the Whitley system.​[48]​  
	At this point the civil service was organised in three main blocs; the CSF, the POWU and the IPCS.  Unhappy at the retreat from the Whitley Councils, a meeting with Blythe was requested by all three organisations.​[49]​  Within a few weeks however the unity of the service associations was broken.  The CSF, assured by the minister that the council’s mechanisms could be revised to remedy any defects that might emerge once it was working, agreed to give it a trial.  The CSCA, after a divisive debate, agreed to stick with the Federation and work the scheme but only under protest.​[50]​  The POWU and the IPCS remained convinced that the scheme was completely unacceptable and both protested at the Federation’s decision to break ranks with the rest of the service.  Confident that the other associations would have to eventually come on board the government pressed ahead and the Civil Service Representative Council (CSRC), without either the POWU or the IPCS, held its first meeting on 15 March 1926.  The fragmentation of the civil service organisation is evident in the range of associations on the CSRC.  The only general service classes represented were the executive officers (AEO) and the clerical officers (CSCA).  The rest of the staff side was made up of fourteen associations, many with less than a hundred members.​[51]​  The weakness of the civil service position can be explained in part by them failing to escape the model of organisation inherited from the British associations.  The Irish departments and grades were too small to accommodate the organisational structures of the British service.  This was encouraged by the Whitley councils which were themselves organised on a grade and department basis.  Deference to British norms and habit reproduced the British model of organisation by grade, but the total membership of the Irish association was often less than that of a single branch of its sister organisation in Britain.  The POWU description of the CSRC as ‘utterly worthless’ proved correct.  Whilst the civil servants might have continued to refer to it as a “conciliation” council the minister, correctly, referred to it as a “representative” council.  From the beginning the CSRC proved unsatisfactory and the “recognised” associations within the CSF pressed an unconvinced minister to accept that the constitution had to be revised.​[52]​

The Transferred Officers’ Protection Association
In order to deal with its obligations under Article 10 of the Treaty the Provisional Government established an advisory committee on compensation for discharged and retired civil servants under the chairmanship of Justice Wylie.​[53]​  The Wylie committee had an official side of two senior officers nominated by the Department of Finance and a staff side of two representatives drawn from the CSF.  There were already signs that civil servants were intent on a mass exodus on the generous terms available under Article 10, rather than suffer what were clearly going to be a hardening of conditions under the new government.​[54]​  The civil service associations had concerns about the Wylie committee.  Firstly, it would only deal with those civil servants who were leaving the service and thus would have nothing to say on those who remained and, secondly, it assumed that the recently created Civil Service Federation represented all civil servants even though the IPCS and the POWU remained outside the Federation.​[55]​  It was also of concern that the committee would be advising the Minister of Finance on compensation rather than making a firm determination.  A minister is always free to reject advice.  Unhappy at many rulings of the committee the IPCS, which did not have any representation on the Wylie committee, began looking for an opportunity to challenge it in the courts.​[56]​ The main question centred on how the pension entitlements were calculated and whether these pensions were ‘fair compensation’ as promised by article 10.​[57]​  Two cases emerged as promising vehicles to challenge the compensation committee in the courts; that of John Howard Wigg and that of Robert Oliver Cochrane, both of them members of the IPCS.  
Early in 1925, as it became clear that the government was going to fight the case of Wigg-Cochrane, the IPCS combined forces with the POWU, the CSF and the Irish Treaty Pensioner’s Association to form the Transferred Officers’ Protection Association (TOPA).​[58]​  The object of TOPA was to ‘safeguard the rights of members under article 77 and 78 of the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann and Article 10 of the Treaty’.​[59]​  The driving force behind TOPA was William Norton, general-secretary of the POWU and later leader of the Labour Party.​[60]​  The twelve-member executive of the TOPA was made up of four appointed by the POWU, four by the CSF and four by the IPCS.​[61]​  Thus TOPA was a much more unified organisation of the civil service than the Federation and, as most civil servants in the Free State were “transferred officers”, might well have proved a base to build cross-service unity but in fact it never became more than an organisation to fight the Wigg-Cochrane case.  Nevertheless, as such, it was an undoubted success.  The Wigg-Cochrane case opened up a fascinating debate on the status of the civil service inherited from the former regime and established that these Irish civil servants had, under Article 10 of the Treaty, rights that were guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore defensible in law.​[62]​   It is therefore ironic that the civil service unions and associations that had failed to build a unified platform to negotiate on behalf of those civil servants staying in the Irish Free State came together to fight successfully the cause of those who were retiring.
For the civil service associations the purpose of the Wigg-Cochrane case was not to enforce the rights of retired former civil servants, but to compel the government to reinstate some form of Whitley Councils, to determine pensions in the first instance but ultimately to re-establish arbitration as a permanent part of the transferred civil service industrial relations.  The civil service made a direct connection between the rush of resignations, 600 in six months, and the aggressive attitude of the government, saying; ‘it will not do to tell us we have no right to strike and deny us at the same time adequate conciliation and arbitration machinery for the settlement of legitimate grievances’.​[63]​  The time and effort of the Wigg-Cochrane case had the effect of identifying the civil service organisations with those civil servants who were retiring and therefore being of little relevance to the vast majority that were staying on.  The CSCA, which was the largest organisation of the lower grades, virtually ignored the case.​[64]​  

The Brennan Commission and renewing the struggle for arbitration.
The civil service associations as a body generally identified with and supported the Irish Labour Party.  The clerical officers association had affiliated to the ILPTUC in 1920.  Archie Heron, an Ulster Protestant, a republican veteran of 1916 and a Labour party activist married to James Connolly’s daughter Ina, was appointed the full-time general secretary of the CSCA in December 1928.​[65]​  The CEA, as soon as it was formed, also affiliated to the ILPTUC.  The POWU had, of course, William Norton the later leader of the Labour Party, as its first fulltime general secretary.  Given that there were significant differences in the status and labour power of civil servants and the working class, the links between them were surprisingly strong and the civil service union motions for debate at Congress were generally supported.​[66]​  The Civil Service Federation also affiliated to the international organisation of civil service trade unions, the International Federation of Public Officials.​[67]​  In 1929 a renewed agitation within the Irish civil service was driven by William Norton of the POWU, Archie Heron of the CSCA and T.J. Hughes of the CSF.  The campaign around which the civil service began to build a new cross-service unity was on the operation of the “war bonus” and the demand for an arbitration board.  When the bonus had been first determined in 1920 it stood at 130, that is the purchasing power of £100 in 1914 was represented by £230 in 1920.  However only the lower civil service salaries were fully compensated for this inflation by a bonus of 130 per cent.  As part of the contribution of the civil service to restoring the national economy, higher officers had their bonus reduced therefore denying them full compensation.  These rates had been further cut by the “supercut” of September 1921.  The bonus had risen initially but with the onset of the post-war depression, and especially as prices collapsed after the Wall Street crash, the bonus had fallen.  Thus civil servants’ actual income had declined year on year since the foundation of the state.  In addition the civil service had also to accept the general increase in income taxation and longer hours of work with shorter holidays.​[68]​  An extraordinary innovation was introduced in 1925 when the government imposed a differential scale for married and unmarried civil servants whereby single men and women were paid less than married men, who also got an additional allowance for any children.​[69]​          
  More than anything else it was the campaign for a fairer calculation of the bonus forged unity and fighting spirit across the civil service.  The CSCA published a monthly journal as a vehicle for information and to heighten its profile.​[70]​ The journal, An Peann, Irisleabhar Chumainn na Stáit Chléireach, Official Organ of the Civil Service Clerical Association, was a quality production with regular reports on branches, executive council meetings, meetings with officials, Dáil reports, updates on the fortunes of civil service in other countries, pieces in Gaelic and regular reports of civil service sports activity.  Other civil service associations also maintained contact with their membership by publishing high quality journals.  These journals included An Díon, Organ of the Post Office Workers’ Union; Irisleabhar, Journal of the Customs and Excise Federation; and Iris Seirbhíse An Stáit (The Civil Service Journal) Official Organ of the Civil Service Federation were vital to the morale of the membership and the prestige of the associations.​[71]​
  	In December 1929 Norton invited Heron and Hughes, along with the IPCS, to join together in a new permanent Joint Council of Civil Service Organisations.​[72]​  The bemergence of Norton and Heron as leaders marks a new public strategy for civil service agitation.  They organised a mass demonstration by the civil service in opposition to the government cuts in the cost-of-living bonus.​[73]​  In the absence of an arbitration forum they politicised the issue of the cost of living bonus by lobbying TDs to support the demand for a new calculation of the bonus figure.  Blythe was to be harassed by constant questioning by sympathetic, well-briefed Labour and other deputies.  An Peann urged all civil servants to question candidates in the next general election on their attitudes and policies on civil service pay, an action that was censured by the cabinet as overtly political.​[74]​  At the same time a publicity campaign on civil service pay and conditions was launched aimed at the newspapers to educate public opinion.  The Department of Finance, shocked at the public protests and political agitation, cautioned the civil service representatives not to write to the press on official matters.   This clumsy attempt at censorship was immediately published in the civil service journal Iris.​[75]​   
Blythe, whilst indicating a willingness to discuss any issues with the civil service, maintained his refusal to meet any representative of the civil service who was not himself a civil servant.  The problem was that Archie Heron and William Norton were both full-time union organisers, and not civil servants.  Blythe maintained that as non-civil servants they would have access to confidential information but would not be bound by the rules of secrecy and disclosure that ordinarily covered public servants.  The more pressing reason was that, as was becoming evident, both Heron and Norton were gifted organisers and skilled negotiators.​[76]​  H.P. Boland, the Establishments secretary in the Department of Finance, who clearly had a fetish about controlling access to the minister, had suggested that the service representation might be recast on the model of Northern Ireland where the departments directly elected their delegates, emasculating the cross-service associations.​[77]​  
The civil service joint committee decided to step up the campaign against the bonus cut through well-publicised mass meetings of the civil service.​[78]​  With the end of the seven-year transition period the Treaty right to retire ‘as a consequence of the change of government’ had ended.  The threat of mass resignation, however unlikely it might have been in reality, was no longer available.​[79]​  The agitation would include high profile public meetings of the impoverished wives and families of civil servants with advertisements in the press.  With a further cut in the bonus due at the beginning of September a mass meeting of civil servants, addressed by Norton, Hughes and Heron, passed the motion that, ‘having regard to the hardship involved, especially in the case of the lower paid classes, [this meeting] calls for the suspension of the impending reduction in the cost of living bonus and an immediate inquiry into the coat of living index figure and its application the Civil Service’.  The meeting also asked that ‘steps should be taken to institute suitable conciliation and arbitration machinery for the Service’.​[80]​  An Peann maintained the campaign, carrying articles and letters critical of the government record on pay and promotions and urging members to come out in support of the Labour Party in the next general election.  The campaign focussed on the demand for an inquiry into the bonus and the method of its calculation.  It would have wiser, as we shall see, to have concentrated on the application of the bonus, rather than its calculation.
     
Fianna Fáil in power
During the 1932 general election campaign Fianna Fáil introduced the threatened cuts in civil service pay as an election issue.​[81]​  In a speech in Rathmines in Dublin South, a middle class suburban constituency where many civil servants lived and where Seán Lemass was the party candidate, de Valera promised that though public service pay would have to be examined those civil servants on salaries below £300 or £400 a year would not be cut.  Furthermore he stated it as his belief that ‘it is only right that there should be an Arbitration Board for the Civil Service to deal with matters between the Service and Executive.  We would be prepared to agree that an Arbitration Board be set up and would assent to an inquiry into the basis on which the cost-of-living bonus was calculated’.​[82]​  Fianna Fáil’s courting of the public service was in part a reassuring gesture towards civil service fears (fears that were shared with the army and the police) that if elected it would be a target for attack by the former anti-Treaty republicans.  But it was primarily a shrewd attempt to win the support of the massed lower ranks of an increasingly disgruntled civil service.  The threatened cuts in salaries, the generally sympathetic attitude of Fianna Fáil, along with the promise of an arbitration board meant that most civil servants welcomed the change of government in February 1932, especially as the minority Fianna Fáil government depended on the support of the Labour Party, now led by William Norton of the POWU who was elected in Dublin.​[83]​  
  	Fianna Fáil shared with the civil service associations a dislike of the senior civil servants in the Department of Finance who described by MacEntee as ‘intensely hostile to Fianna Fáil…unalterably and fanatically attached to the English interest’.​[84]​  In Tod Andrews’ more colourful description they were seen as ‘a crowd of Free State bastards’.​[85]​  Many civil servants welcomed indications of the end of the dominance that the Department of Finance previously enjoyed.​[86]​  The May 1932 budget, far from retrenching, promised increases in road-building, housing, unemployment benefit and pensions.
	
The Johnson and Brennan Commissions
The Fianna Fáil government moved to meet their commitments to the civil service on the bonus and on an arbitration board.  Two committees were announced, a committee to enquire into the principles and methods of the calculation of the cost of living index figure under Senator Thomas Johnson, the former Labour Party leader, and a Commission to enquire into ‘the method by which arbitration can best be applied for the settlement of questions relating to pay and conditions of service’ under Joseph Brennan, former secretary of the Department of Finance.​[87]​   The promise, as it seemed, of a new era of state-civil service relations galvanised the civil service associations.  The CSCA now dominated the organisation of the lower grades.  The POWU had of course their own general secretary Norton elected to the Dáil.  The IPCS April 1932 annual general meeting featured a long discussion on the future policy of the Institution.​[88]​  The IPCS met with the CSF to compare their proposals for an arbitration scheme and bring them both into line so as to ensure the maximum of cross service unanimity in meetings with the Brennan Commission.​[89]​
Neither of these commissions lived up to the hopes of the civil service.  There was disappointment that the Johnson commission had a narrow brief that precluded examining the application of the cost of living bonus rather than simply its calculation.  Any examination of its application would have to look at the injustice of the reductions in bonus at the higher salaries.  The campaign by the civil service associations failed to make this distinction clear.  Instead their campaign seemed to suggest that they suffered because the index was based on a working class rather than middle class budget with the attendant extras of insurance, higher rents and the cost of maidservants.​[90]​  
At the Brennan commission hearings Boland was prepared to admit that what he termed ‘the fleshpots of Whitleyism’ were of great value to the civil servant, but he was also absolutely sure that it was bad for the state.  The ability to make decisions ought to be reserved to the highest circles of the state and it would be unacceptable that lower staff should have a hand in that process.  Boland also suggested, without being explicit, that Whitleyism was a relict of the former British regime and that the demand for it was primarily from transferred officers who pined for the old days.  
The civil service representatives kept their contributions focused on concrete issues of salary levels and their determination.  They scotched Boland’s assertion that the civil service was well paid compared with other similar employments, as well as the “article of faith” that civil service conditions were inherited from the British regime and preserved by Article 10 of the Treaty and any interference would be unconstitutional.  The view of the association representatives was that the state ought to be a model employer.  The main problem so far as they were concerned was the dominance of the Department of Finance on staff matters, which never looked beyond cost.  Their recommendation was a specialised department of the State should take over but that the pay and conditions of the civil service should not be in the hands of elected politicians.​[91]​   In fact the Brennan Commission had been thoroughly ‘stitched up’ by Brennan and Boland.  Brennan’s own correspondence shows that he and Boland were in complete agreement that any form of arbitration would fatally undermine the control that the department had over the civil service.  By preparing and rehearsing questions before the daily sittings of the commission Boland and Brennan between them ruthlessly undermined the promises made by Fianna Fáil to introduce a system of arbitration.​[92]​  It is worth noting that the cabinet agreed to pay Boland a gratuity of £450 for his services to the Brennan commission, which suggests that the cabinet was not unhappy at his success in undermining a government pledge.​[93]​  The civil service organisations soon recognised the futility of the effort and decided early in the proceedings to make no further statement to the commission.​[94]​
The Johnson committee proved as disappointing.  Limited to the operation of the cost of living figure Johnson was convinced by the argument of the civil servants that the figure was based on a cost of living of a working class rather than a middle class family.  However such a figure would not in fact alter the final result of the calculation, the general tendency to fall was simply confirmed via a different route.  He recommended that a middle class figure might be usefully compiled as a reassurance to the civil service and that alcoholic drink ought to be added to the basket of goods used in reckoning the cost of living.  The Department of Finance were relieved at these findings.  The real weakness of the figure was that it was based on a countrywide computation that made no allowance for the very significant difference between Dublin and the rest of the country in, for instance, rent.  The fear that Johnson might recommend a separate figure for Dublin from that of the rest of the country was not borne out.  The department could delay on establishing the middle class cost of living figure in the expectation that the basic plus bonus salaries of the civil service would probably be consolidated into a single figure within ten years. Effort could now concentrate on ensuring that consolidation occurred at the lowest figure possible.​[95]​

‘No man is worth more than £1000’
The civil service associations did get their face-to-face meeting with the minister, but in circumstances they had not expected.  A decision by the Fianna Fáil government to impose salary cuts created an unprecedented unity across the entire civil service, embracing even their former nemesis Boland.  In the context of the Economic War a cabinet committee recommended cuts in public service pay ranging from two per cent on a salary of £200 to a staggering twenty per cent on a salary of £1,500.​[96]​  These cuts were not simply reductions in the bonus but cuts in the basic salaries, which had hitherto been sacrosanct.  These cuts were not designed to deliver any substantial savings to the exchequer, nor could they.​[97]​  Instead they should be seen as an implementation of the long-standing Fianna Fáil axiom of cheap government, frugal comfort and egalitarian poverty as the basis for national revival.  In the Dáil de Valera had threatened to ‘cut off the top hats’ and his belief that ‘no man is worth more than £1000’ was confirmed by the experience of office.  His first act as president of the executive was to reduce his own and his ministers salaries.​[98]​  De Valera was a man who liked sacrifice.  The cuts in public service pay which the Cumann na nGaedheal government had proposed as an economic measure were revived by Fianna Fáil but now as a social measure designed to effect a general levelling of incomes across Irish society.​[99]​  All branches of the state service were to experience reductions in pay.  Those civil servants protected by Article 10 along with the judiciary were to offer voluntary reductions.​[100]​  Not surprisingly the proposed cuts, contradicting as they did the whole tenor of the 1932 election campaign and the promise of the Brennan and Johnson inquiries, met with an implacable opposition from the civil service.  Those opposed included the most senior departmental heads in the civil service who now found themselves on the receiving end of the rhetoric they had been delivering to their staff.​[101]​  
In June MacEntee indicated that to the civil service organisations that he would be available to the CSRC to discuss staff reaction to the cuts if the POWU, CSCA and the IPCS would rejoin the representative council.​[102]​  The three organisations met to co-ordinate a response.  The IPCS was very reluctant to re-enter a CSRC that they rejected as an inadequate forum but because the issue of cuts was one that affected the whole service and was therefore one on which a united cross service fight was possible the decision was made to re-join.  The CSCA were tempted if only because the minister had raised no objection to Archie Heron being their delegate.  The POWU, led by William Norton, was now the only civil service association that still refused to re-join the CSRC.  But with Norton now in the Dáil and with Fianna Fáil needing the support of Labour, it may have seemed to the POWU that it had the better forum for negotiation. 
 Faced with a wall of resistance the government shelved the cuts and established another committee, essentially to gain time, charged with inquiring into ‘the facts and circumstances regarding the pay of each of the services…with a view to definite recommendations being made to government as to what reductions could be made’ to achieve a reduction of £250,000 in the current year.​[103]​  The O’Connell ‘Cuts’ Committee as it became known included a cattle dealer and two farmers, as well as a chartered accountant, Donal O’Connor, and the chairman Philip O’Connell, director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation.  The O’Connell committee failed to agree on the extent to which the civil service salaries ought to be cut.  The farmer representatives recommended that the basic salary as well as bonus be cut.  In fact they recommended that discontented civil servants be sent to spend ‘some time in the beet fields of Leinster, the cow pastures of the Kerry hills or the turf banks of the Bog of Allen for £1 a week’ to bring them to their senses.​[104]​  The other members of the committee reported that the civil servants’ basic salary was already so low that it should not be cut but that the variable bonus could bear a further cut.  So far as the minister was concerned neither report was useful as neither recommended the level of cuts already signalled.
When the ‘cuts’ committee invited written submissions from the associations it was decided not to bother. ​[105]​  The associations asked that the bonus cut due in January 1933 should be postponed until the Johnson committee could make its report.​[106]​  The government agreed that pending the report fifty per cent of the drop in bonus due to begin in January 1933 should be suspended on basic salaries below £2 per week.​[107]​   
A Fianna Fáil majority
By late 1932 the Fianna Fáil government was coming under increasing pressure.  The anger of the larger farmers hit by the Economic War allied with frustration within the Cumann na nGaedheal party, led to the creation of the fascistic Army Comrades Association or ‘Blueshirts’.  Street fights between the Blueshirts and released IRA men created a fear of social disintegration.  The government’s attempts to restore control of the budget were being frustrated by the civil service and teacher resistance.  When Norton warned in late December that his party would not support the public service pay cuts de Valera dissolved the Dáil during the Christmas recess. In the shortest possible election campaign, exploiting the disunity in the opposition, Fianna Fáil won a clear majority of one seat.​[108]​  
	The cabinet returned immediately to considering the cuts in public service pay.  It was decided to impose percentage cuts on all public service salaries above £320 per annum ranging from one per cent to ten per cent, to last for one year only.​[109]​  The bill to implement the cuts, the Public Services (Temporary Economies) Bill was brought before the Dáil on 24 March.  The civil service associations co-ordinated a joint strategy of refusing to discuss or bargain, only offering an emphatic “no” to the Bill at the representative council, and insisting that it be brought to arbitration.​[110]​  In the absence of any other strategy the civil service associations all returned to pursuing the minister from within the CSRC whilst forwarding amendments to the Dáil and Seanad in an attempt, ultimately futile, to weaken the Bill.​[111]​ 
In October 1934 the cabinet agreed on the outlines of an arbitration scheme for the civil service based on the Interim Report of the Brennan Commission published in July (a report which the civil service unions had immediately rejected) and directed the Department of Finance to flesh it out.  Finance was also instructed to prepare a memorandum to confine membership of the Civil Service Representative Council to serving civil servants.​[112]​   The Association of Officers of the Executive and Higher Grades (the former AEO), the Civil Service Federation, the Civil Service Clerical Association, the Post Office Workers’ Union and the Custom and Excise Officers Association all immediately rejected the scheme.​[113]​  Their reasons for their united and unequivocal rejection of the scheme were that the prior consent of the minister was required before a claim could be referred to the Arbitration Board;  ministerial approval of the terms of reference were required; the minister nominated the chairman of the Board; the representatives of the civil servants had to be themselves serving civil servants; the government could adopt or reject any award made by the Board; and the findings of the arbitrator could not be published except by direction of the government.  What was on offer was clearly not arbitration as usually understood, in fact it was merely consultation by grace and favour of the Minister of Finance. 
The  government decision to press on what was clearly an unacceptable arbitration scheme may have been prompted by evidence of division within the civil service associations.  It came to light in the public and bitter row between Norton of the POWU and Hughes of the Civil Service Federation.  Hughes suggested that Norton was failing to use the political pressure that was at his command to force the government to establish an acceptable arbitration scheme.  Norton retaliated by accusing Hughes and the Federation of splitting the civil service organisations by attending the Civil Service Representative Council when all the other associations had recognised that it was a useless body.  He described the Federation as the ‘best friend’ of the Department of Finance and the representative council as the ‘official muzzle’ on civil service associations.​[114]​  

The Civil Service Alliance
In the absence of any success the civil service campaign for arbitration was compelled to become public and highly political.  In January 1937 the civil service organisations agreed to combine in a new organisation, the Civil Service Alliance.  The Alliance, formed to ‘deal with all matters of common concern to the affiliated bodies or to significant sections of such bodies’ was understood to be in fact the organisational vehicle for a united campaign on arbitration.   The Alliance represented sixteen associations organising ninety per cent of civil servants.  Its president and the initial sponsor was Hughes of both the Executive and Higher Officers’ Association and Federation.  The secretary was Archie Heron of the Clerical Officers Association and the treasurer was Cairns of the POWU.​[115]​  The Alliance was also a response to an ultimatum from the Department of Finance saying that unless the civil service associations accepted the government scheme and indicated clearly their willingness to work it the scheme offered would be withdrawn in its entirety.​[116]​  De Valera published his new constitution on 1 May 1937.  It was widely anticipated that the referendum on the constitution would be accompanied by a general election.  On 14 June he dissolved the Dáil, setting 1 July as polling day.  In the election the Labour Party made significant gains, doubling its vote and winning 13 seats in the new Dáil.​[117]​  Amongst the new Labour TDs was Archie Heron, returned for Dublin North-West.  Heron, along with Norton, meant that the civil service had a powerful presence in the Labour Party.  The raucous celebrations by civil servants within government buildings as the results came in brought a stern rebuke from Boland in Finance.​[118]​  Labour was not going to support Fine Gael, but Norton made it clear that the minority Fianna Fáil government could not assume the support of his party.  Amongst the key issues for Labour would be civil service arbitration.​[119]​ 
	The debate on a motion by Deputy Costello directing the government to immediately establish arbitration for the civil service began on 30 March 1938 and continued to May.  Costello made a good job of demolishing the argument that the constitution’s requirement that the government could not assign responsibility for public spending to an arbitrator.  Heron spoke on the psychological effect on both sides of the presence of an arbitrator, arguing his presence would mean each side striving to reach agreement.  Norton, in his usual pugnacious style, attacked MacEntee relentlessly.  MacEntee, forced to reply, said that the civil service associations had adopted an attitude toward the government that caused him great regret and he attacked Heron in particular for politicising the civil service through his work as general secretary of the clerical officers.  He did offer an olive branch to the civil service associations by suggesting that if they accepted the basic principles of the government scheme he would be prepared to amend it on lines they might suggest.  In the vote, taken on 25 May 1938, the government to their own and everyone else’s surprise were defeated by one vote.  It was generally expected that Fianna Fáil would try to get around the defeat by calling for a confidence motion.  Instead de Valera dissolved the Dáil on 27 May and set 10 June as polling day.​[120]​      
	Although Fianna Fáil campaigned mainly on the successful negotiations with the British government that ended the Economic War, and on the need for stable majority government, the question of arbitration in the civil service was pursued by MacEntee.  Deeply conservative as he was, MacEntee did see valid constitutional difficulties in the manner that the civil service had run the campaign for arbitration.  In 1932 the civil service had been circularised by the Department of Finance on the proper attitude of civil servants in regards to political matters.  The circular stated that civil servants were expected to show a reserve in politics and ought not do anything that would ‘give colour to any suggestion that his official actions are in any way influenced, or capable of being influenced, by party motives’.  Specifically, civil servants were forbidden ‘to be a member of an association or serve on a committee having for its object the promotion of the interests of a political party or the promotion or prevention of the return of a particular candidate to the Dáil’; nor were officials to publicly support or oppose any Dáil  candidate; nor make statements to the newspapers or comment publicly on any matter of current political interest.​[121]​  The civil service associations had breached each of these regulations in the campaign leading up to the Dáil  defeat.  T.J. Hughes, on behalf of the Civil Service Alliance, had appealed to each TD to vote in favour of the opposition motion.  Eamon Bolger, Honorary Secretary of the Rathmine’s branch of the POWU had written to MacEntee pointedly reminding him that many of his constituents who were members of the POWU were taking a keen interest in the debate and Archie Heron had written to each civil service association in the Alliance urging members to approach the TDs in their constituencies asking them to vote for the motion.​[122]​    
It would have to be admitted that even an entrenched conservative such as MacEntee could have a valid point.  In his view, if he entered negotiations with Norton and Heron he could never be sure whether he was in negotiation with the secretaries of civil service organisations or with Labour Party TDs and activists.  They could use the Dáil  chamber as a second forum for negotiation in which to win concessions denied in formal processes.  Given the choice of believing that either the civil service had captured the Labour Party or that the Labour Party had captured the civil service, he choose to believe the latter.  The journals of the civil service organisations do, as MacEntee alleged, sometimes read more like Labour Party organs.  In the campaign leading up to the vote these journals had urged TDs to vote for an opposition motion knowing that, if successful, it would lead to the defeat of the government.  His press statement allege that ‘the real purpose behind the agitation of Deputy Norton and his associates was to take control of the Civil Service out of the hands of the government…he doubted whether the majority of the unfortunate civil servants who were being used as stalking horses by these politicians even knew what was in the government’s scheme’.​[123]​  
	In the election Fianna Fáil won 52 per cent of the popular vote, the first party in the history of independent Ireland to win a popular majority.  Labour lost five seats, Archie Heron’s included.​[124]​  Fianna Fáil was able to form a stable single-party government and the civil service, that had so publicly nailed its colours to the Labour masthead, now had to learn to live with that fact.  Bowing to the inevitable the Alliance met with MacEntee, now reinstalled as Minister for Finance, to discuss how his arbitration scheme might work.  Having conceded the victory to the minister the staff side were given a very good reception and MacEntee seemed to be open to their suggestions.​[125]​  The question of non-civil service representatives remained contentious, but with the resignation of Archie Heron from the CSCA to take up the post of secretary to the Irish Local Government Officers’ Union and his replacement by a serving civil servant, the question was in fact conceded.  The framework of an arbitration scheme began to take shape.  Departmental Councils would provide a conciliation service, with a General Council for general service matters.  An Arbitration Board would be established under a Chairman acceptable to both sides, though still appointed by the Minister.  Arbitration would cover classes whose normal pay did not exceed £500 per annum, that is up to Administrative Officer level.  Then, with the outbreak of war in Europe and the declaration of a State of Emergency, the discussions and the process of drafting legislation were immediately suspended.​[126]​ 

The ‘Emergency’ and informal arbitration
In meetings with the Department of Finance the Civil Service Alliance offered mixed signals.  On the declaration of war it had offered full co-operation with the government during the Emergency including working extra hours without overtime payment.  The reason that the Alliance made this generous offer was that it held to the belief that full co-operation implied full consultation in whatever measures were thought necessary.​[127]​  This was not an uncommon assumption by the public service unions, the ILGOU also hoped that its offer of closer co-operation with the government would lead to future recognition of the union for negotiations on conditions of service.​[128]​ Comhaltas Cána, the organisation of the Customs and Excise officers, not only offered unconditional loyalty but also £500 by way of an interest-free loan to the exchequer.​[129]​  In early November there was an informal meeting between the Alliance and the senior civil servants of the Department of Finance.  Whilst the Alliance delegates insisted that the demand for a conciliation and arbitration board would be maintained, despite the Emergency, they did agree to informal consultation with representatives of Finance from time to time.  The Finance side however made it conditional that no pay claims could be discussed at these meetings.  The attraction for the Alliance was that the official side accepted that ‘it is desirable to have a clearing house for proposals which the staff wish to discuss, and it was agreed that the Civil Service Alliance would prove a suitable medium for this purpose’.​[130]​  The Alliance represented a wide span of organisations across the civil service grades but it was dominated by the Association of Officers of the Executive and Higher Grades and the Clerical Officers’ Association.  It may have hoped that the Alliance would act as a cohesive and co-ordinating organisation in the  struggle for conciliation and arbitration that would be resumed after the Emergency.  Discussions, however informal, would in any case establish the Alliance as the voice of the civil service.  The discussions that did occur between the Alliance and the senior civil servants of the Department of Finance, especially with John Moynihan with whom the civil service found they could talk frankly, were useful in establishing good personal relations with the senior civil servants if not with the minister.​[131]​   

‘Emergency’ wage controls and the civil service




The end of wage controls
Sean Lemass, appointed tánaiste and clearly the heir to de Valera, emerged from the Emergency period with his authority enhanced.    The fear of a wages free-for-all led him to propose a wages policy based on discussions between labour and employers rather than on government dictation.  The basis of his wage policy was the Labour Court, established by the Industrial Relations Act 1946, as a permanent industrial relations body of trade union and employer representatives which would arbitrate on all issues between labour and employers and reach voluntary agreements without the disruption of strikes.  The Labour Court, was however an arbitration system for the private sector.  Civil servants were expressly excluded from its remit by section 4 of the 1946 Act.  Thus the Department of finance retained its control of civil service pay levels.​[136]​  During the Emergency the Civil Service Alliance had been led to believe that though an arbitration scheme could not be introduced it during the Emergency, as soon as possible after the end of the war there would be such.  At a meeting in October 1945 the staff associations were given the predictable news that the minister had decided that despite the end of the war he would not concede any conciliation and arbitration scheme for the civil service.​[137]​ 
The civil service seethed with anger at duplicity of the government that worked hard at promoting the virtues of arbitration to the private sector but denied them to their own employees.  The feeling was that the Emergency had been used to enforce a decline in civil service salaries and that loyalty to the State had been badly abused.  Civil servants had accepted additional duties and heavier responsibilities to ensure the survival of the State and in return had been used as an instrument to enforce a decline in wage levels.  The voluntary offer of an additional half an hour of work a day had been pocketed by the government and had in fact become normal as the Minister for Finance announced that normal hours would not apply for at least two years after the end of the Emergency.​[138]​   
In the Autumn of 1946 the Department of Finance contacted the Civil Service Alliance, the Association of Higher Civil Servants and the POWU to discuss the restoration of the bonus.  These discussion quickly turned to the question of the level at which a new wages policy that offered a consolidated pay scale and abandoned the periodic sliding bonus would be set.  The government offered consolidation at the 270, when its calculation suggested that a figure of 245 would have been a more accurate compensation for the rise in the cost of living.  This high figure was offered in order to secure a voluntary abandonment of the sliding scale system.​[139]​  For the civil service this figure of 270 represented a loss as, according to their calculations full compensation for the cost of living increase would have given a figure of 310.  The Department of Finance had succeeded in ensuring that consolidation had occurred at the lowest cost possible.

Arbitration and Conciliation finally achieved
Labour had two ministers in the coalition government of 1948,William Norton (who was also Tánaiste) in Social Welfare and T.J. Murphy in Local Government.  The young Brendan Corish was appointed parliamentary secretary to T.J. Murphy.​[140]​  For the civil service associations the presence of the Labour Party in government transformed the struggle for a conciliation and arbitration scheme.  Norton, as general secretary of the POWU, and as a TD and leader of the Labour Party, had been a leading voice in the demand for such a scheme since the foundation of the state.  With Norton now in the cabinet it was immediately delivered.  For the Department of Finance the decision in principle to negotiate an arbitration and conciliation scheme made the question of representation and recognition an immediate and central concern.​[141]​  The Department of Finance, for obvious reasons, preferred to deal with as few associations as possible.  The tendency toward grade exclusiveness within the civil service militated against this.  In fact, once the principle of a scheme had been determined by the minister, the senior officials of the department, most especially Moynihan, moved quickly to bring it into being.  The fear was that after a scheme would be agreed an association would emerge that had not been represented in the negotiations and belatedly reject some aspect of the scheme.   Agreement on a conciliation and arbitration scheme was quickly reached, reflecting the long period during which the concept had been argued and also the model provided by the well-established British Whitley scheme.   The scheme, the foundation of all later civil service schemes, provided a conciliation system for negotiations on matters affecting conditions of service and an arbitration board to which the civil service associations and the Minister for Finance had access in the event of disagreement.  The conciliation stage consisted of a general council and departmental councils, each composed of representatives of the minister (the official side) and an equal number of representatives of the staff (the staff side) with each side also providing a secretary.  The general council dealt with matters concerning the whole service or with matters concerning a class common to two or more departments.  These matters might include pay, promotion, or working conditions.  The departmental councils dealt with the heads of the department on purely departmental issues.  The result of the general council discussions were brought to the minister who gave his decision on any agreed recommendations.  If the recommendation, or the decision of the minister, was considered unsatisfactory then the matter could be brought to arbitration.  The arbitration board consisted of an agreed chairman, two official side and two staff side representatives.  The findings of the arbitration board were submitted to the government who might accept them or ask the Dáil to reject or modify them.  There were therefore some important limitations to the scheme; only claims made on behalf of classes could be brought to conciliation, individual cases were not catered for.  Also, the minister retained the power to reject any arbitration finding, with the permission of the Dáil.  Finally, the scheme was only available to those classes and grades below £500 basic salary, the Higher Executive Officer scale, thus excluding the higher grades. Nevertheless, an important advance empowering the civil service associations had been achieved.  The successful creation of the conciliation and arbitration scheme greatly enhanced the status and attractiveness of the associations.  On 30 July 1949, at a public ceremony, the scheme was signed into effect by McGilligan the Minister for Finance and representatives of the civil service associations. 

Fianna Fáil and a revised conciliation and arbitration scheme
On 14 June the new Dáil  assembled and Fianna Fáil returned to power with MacEntee once again Minister for Finance.  One week later, on 20 June, MacEntee announced that the recent arbitration award and its follow-on awards to the Gardaí and defence forces had added about £2.4 million to the demands being made on the exchequer.  The conciliation and arbitration scheme had written into its terms a review after one year of operation.  He therefore was suspending the conciliation and arbitration scheme and would begin a review of its operation. ​[142]​  The civil service organisations feared that the suspension of conciliation and arbitration was a prelude to its abolition.  MacEntee did admit, when questioned by McGilligan in the Dáil, that he always regarded arbitration with a great deal of apprehension as it tended to remove the control of civil service pay from the control of government.  However, as it had been conceded by the previous government the Fianna Fáil government would honour the scheme.  Revealing what may perhaps have been a deeper objection, he attacked the linkages between the civil service and the trade union movement and the political agitation that it had mounted through the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress.​[143]​  The main amendments from the official side related to recognition of associations for negotiation.  Under the original scheme different organisations had claimed to represent the same grades and classes.  Under the revised scheme the associations would apply for recognition to the minister.  On securing recognition only the recognised association would have access to the scheme for the grades and classes it represented.  The other issue that the minister included in the amendments was that of political affiliation.  Article Three of the scheme explicitly denied recognition to any association that affiliated to any political organisation after 1 April 1949 or that collected funds or subscriptions to a political organisation.  This was aimed at the Labour Party and, whilst accepting the special relationship enjoyed by the POWU through its general secretary Norton, aimed to prevent any further extension of Labour Party influence in the civil service.  The scheme also explicitly forbad any ‘public agitation as a means of furthering claims or seeking redress for grievances’.  Finally, in June 1952, the new conciliation and arbitration scheme was agreed.  In 1955 the scheme was further revised.   By the end of the second coalition government in March 1957 conciliation and arbitration was an established and accepted procedure for the negotiation and settlement of pay and conditions in the civil service regardless of any nostalgia that the Department of Finance, or a minister, might have for the old ways.  The new Fianna Fáil government, with James Ryan as Minister for Finance, acknowledged that though the scheme did limit the ability of the government to set salary levels in the civil service the advantages of the scheme outweighed the disadvantages and arbitration had become the accepted mode of dealing with the civil service.  The conciliation and arbitration scheme dominated civil service negotiation throughout the 1960s as it was used to develop a web of relativities in which each grade increase gave a boost to other grades and wage levels in the whole of the civil and public service advanced across a broad front.   


The Public Services Committee of Congress
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions had a lively civil service presence since the foundation of the State through the POWU and the CSCA.  Both these Unions had regularly proposed motions on issues of concern to the civil service, such as the long-standing demand for arbitration, poor levels of pay in the public service and the lack of promotion.  Congress had debated these motions with interest and sympathy and the civil service usually received a sympathetic hearing from the general unions.​[144]​   During the 1960s many of the civil and public service associations affiliated to Congress;  the Irish Association of Offices of Tax in 1962; the Local Government and Public Services Union in 1963;  the Irish Customs and Excise Union in  1965; both the Union of Professional and Technical civil Servants and the Civil Service Executive and Higher Officers Association in 1969 and the Association of Higher Civil Servants in 1978.  The entry of most of the civil and public service organisations made the Public Services Committee of Congress the ideal platform for united action across the civil and public service and a decisive change of focus for the civil service trade unionism.  It reflects a general recognition that the future of the civil service lay with developing as part of the trade union movement, in alliance with the broader labour movement.
The conciliation and arbitration scheme which had been initiated in 1950 was straining to cope with a different world in the 1970s.  It had been expected that in the post-war wage rounds pay in the civil and public sector would follow the lead of the private sector.  This was largely the case in the 1950s when pay had simply followed the rise in the cost of living.  The 1964 wage round in the civil service was significant in introducing new status claims which led to a widely varying percentage increases across the state sector and realigned relativities.  The Department of Finance found it useful to confuse its dual role as Government and its role as employer within the ELC.  The pay agreements of the 1970s were negotiated at national level by the ELC with government attending as an employer rather than as the state.  The increases were combinations of flat sum, which were better for the lower paid, and percentage increases, which were better for the higher paid.  These agreements tended to flatten out salary scales in the civil service as a whole.​[145]​  An increasing feature of public discourse on pay and employment in the recessionary 1970s was the identification of the civil service as overstaffed and overpaid, a tendency which the government did little to discourage.​[146]​  The public service trade unions had to work hard at deflecting the anti-tax emotions into the more rational  demand for tax equity. 
Ray McSharry, Minister for Finance in July 1982 announced the postponement of the 5 per cent final instalment of the agreed public service pay deal, with no further pay increases in pay for 1982 and 1983, in effect an eighteen month pay freeze, and staffing restrictions in which two out of every three vacancies were to left unfilled, along with cutbacks of £75 million in government programmes.  The Civil Service Staff Panel and the Public Services Committee of Congress rejected the embargo on new recruitment and called on the trade unions to participate in a campaign to defend existing agreements. A special meeting of the Civil Service Staff Panel representing 60,000 civil and public servants also demanded that the government cease interfering with the conciliation and arbitration process and began to plan a series of public protests and rallies.​[147]​  The public service unions therefore interpreted the government action as an attack on the hard-won process of wage negotiation which had secured civil servants some measure of control over their conditions.  Though the government publicly presented their action as being about pay only, it seemed clear to the public service unions that the main target was in fact the whole system of pay bargaining in the public service.  
The trade union movement had also been doing its own thinking on the national crisis.  Its response was the 1985 ICTU policy paper Confronting the Jobs Crisis.  This policy paper was as much a challenge to the trade union movement as to the government to be creative in thinking on employment.  Its authors realised that that the trade union movement had to work at being part of the solution rather than allowing media commentators portray them as the problem.  The Public Services Committee of Congress succeeded in persuading the wider trade union movement to widen its thinking about wages beyond money to a broader concept of a ‘social wage’.​[148]​  The social wage included those state-provided services which led to a better quality of life for all citizens, such as a health or education service, clean safe neighbourhoods, and cultural institutions.  It was argued that a high social wage could balance a lower cash wage.     
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